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I. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AT ITS BEST 
Lindahl’s work exemplifies what legal scholarship can be if it lives up 
to its full potential. Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion and Exclu-
sion1 is a core contribution to the theory of law in general. This is the case 
even though—and perhaps on the ground that—it has been written in re-
sponse to the perplexities that have arisen in recent decades within private 
and public international law. Against this backdrop the book demonstrates 
how legal scholarship is able to make progress, namely, by exploring how 
certain fields of law have outgrown a received conceptual framework guid-
ing their apprehension by both practitioners and scholars. So-called “theo-
retical” reflection emerges from a doctrinal context when attempts are made 
to account for the limitations inherent in the vocabulary with which legal 
thought links sets of facts with sources of law. The widespread distinction 
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between theoretical and straightforward legal scholarship is just as arbitrary 
as many other social divisions that segregate people and their pursuits into 
different groups or strata of society.2 
The book also shows beautifully what global legal scholarship can and 
should be under conditions of Anglo-American cultural hegemony. Whoever 
comes from a different tradition—be it European, Asian or Latin Ameri-
can—invariably needs, in order to make him or herself heard, to cast some 
less dominant philosophical vernacular in the idiom of analytic legal philos-
ophy (or law and economics, for that matter). This is why we encounter, in 
Lindahl’s work, the repeated attempt to let the ideas of Husserl, Heidegger 
and possibly even Sartre pass as the philosophies of, say, Margaret Gilbert 
or Michael Bratman. This is important, for it promises to transform hege-
monic discourses in the course of their appropriation. As will be seen below, 
in this respect the book in fact reflects its dialogue. It engages in a struggle 
for recognition under conditions of asymmetry. On a performative level, its 
message is thus remarkably consistent. 
II. THE CORE QUESTION 
At the outset, in taking up themes that—on the surface—have been on 
our agenda for decades, namely “law without borders” or law that cuts across 
territorial jurisdictions,3 the book appears to be about spatial borders. But it 
soon reveals that what is driving the project is “space” in a Heideggerian 
sense4 and not space as understood by Cartesian dummies (positions on a 
map – pshaw!). The Heideggerian space again turns out to be a world5 in the 
Husserlian sense of a ‘life world’.6 Such a world recognizes places where 
objects and actions are invested with practical meanings, creating a Bewandt-
niszusammenhang,7 and these meanings reflect a particular situated perspec-
tive on interpreting, ordering and evaluating human conduct (the taking of 
something as something).8 Hence, the more Lindahl’s project unfolds, the 
more the focus shifts from borders to bounds of sense that are constituted in 
 
 2.  I have made this claim before that the distinction between “pedestrian” legal scholarship and 
“detached” legal theory is only a social one. See ALEXANDER SOMEK, RECHTLICHES WISSEN (Suhrkamp, 
2006). 
 3.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 10−11. 
 4.  Id. at 19−20, 48, 66. 
 5.  Id. at 35−36. 
 6.  See EDMUND HUSSERL, DIE KRISIS DER EUROPÄISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN UND DIE 
TRANSZENDENTALE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE: EINE EINLEITUNG IN DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHE PHILOSOPHIE 
52−58 (E. Ströker ed., 2d ed. 1982). 
 7.  See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, SEIN UND ZEIT 84 (Max Niemeyer Verlag ed., 14th ed. 1977). 
 8.  See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER METAPHYSIK: WELT – ENDLICHKEIT – 
EINSAMKEIT 397 (Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). 
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the course of engaging in common action. The trajectory leads, hence, from 
spaces in a Cartesian sense—empty rooms in which one encounters merely 
“positions”9—to spaces in the Heideggerian sense, which are replete with 
practical significance in virtue of providing the indispensable locales for liv-
ing as human beings in a world.10 In a like manner, the emphasis shifts from 
“borders” to “limits.”11 Hence, the study of globalization is essentially about 
the creation, collision and transformation of various legal worlds: 
[…] [L]egal globalizations attest to the entwinement of worlds, where en-
twinement means both interference and interconnection.12 
The project is therefore strongly reminiscent of Teubner’s and Fischer-
Lescano’s “regime collisions.”13 The book speaks incessantly about how not 
only vis-à-vis one another but also with regard to their putative constituents 
fragmentary legal systems create their own conceptual schemes (Davidson’s 
“third dogma”)14 that feed into shared practices.15 They are pluralistic and 
contingent. It is the cognitive and practical bounds of these worlds that un-
derlie what Lindahl repeatedly presents to be the core question of this book: 
[…] [I]s a global legal order possible, even if not actual, which could in-
clude without excluding?16 
As is well known by now, Lindahl does not answer this question in the 
affirmative. Yet, while his work is all about the particularity and contingency 
of bounds of sense—of limits of “fields of sense,” using the language of 
Markus Gabriel’s17—it culminates in a critical discussion of two different 
ways of addressing such particularity: mutual symmetrical and asymmetrical 
recognition. While the former promises to give rise to—in the virtual sense 
of a Kantian regulative idea—an ever more inclusive legal system that grows 
by integrating formerly excluded worlds,18 the latter recognizes the ineradi-
cable asymmetry of inside and outside.19 This alternative invites our atten-
 
 9.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 36−37. 
 10.  Id. at 35, 39, 43, 63. The boundaries in the Cartesian sense are included only trivially, by stating 
that they have to be manifest somewhere in space. Id. at 157. 
 11.  Id. at 26, 36, 64, 157. Never mind that Lindahl talks of “boundaries” too. Id. at 140. 
 12.  Id. at 36. 
 13.  See generally Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-collisions: the Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (Michelle Everson 
trans.) (2004). 
 14.  See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 189 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press ed. 2001) (1984). 
 15.  See generally Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 13. 
 16.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 267−68. See id. at 163, 177, 186, 198. 
 17.  See MARKUS GABRIEL, FIELDS OF SENSE: A NEW REALIST ONTOLOGY (2015). 
 18.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 263, 267. 
 19.  Id. at 275−76. 
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tion to meta-fields of sense-making that do battle in the process of globali-
zation. 
III. TWO FRIENDLY AMENDMENTS 
In what follows, I would like to focus on two basic strategies of this 
remarkable work that nonetheless strike me as problematic. I would like to 
propose a friendly amendment to each. The first is intended to draw out more 
clearly the authoritarian deep structure of global regulation and adjudication, 
while the second calls for greater caution with regard to embracing any jar-
gon of authenticity20 in the context of recognizing the somewhat wearisome 
“otherness of the other.” 
The first strategy consists of viewing legal orders, which are set in legal 
“worlds” or legal “spaces,” as systems of collective action. Lindahl elabo-
rates this idea in what he calls the IACA model of law (“institutionalized and 
authoritatively mediated collective action”).21 I am afraid that the model is 
generally misleading, by which I mean that it is confusing not only in the 
context of global legal orders, but as a legal theory tout court. The reason is, 
plainly and simply, that the model must perceive collective agency where 
there in fact is none. The misattribution of such agency is, therefore, the chief 
demerit of theories of this type. As shall be further explained below, in cases 
that are referred to as “massively shared”22 or “massively alienated”23 
agency, the collective agency model becomes grossly overstretched to a 
point at which it becomes utterly implausible. At the end of the day, the 
model appears to betray an organized vision of collective agency that im-
putes to individuals participation in common action regardless of whether 
they intend it or not. The suggested friendly amendment attempts to avoid 
this pitfall. 
The second strategy consists of suggesting that mutual recognition, ei-
ther in its symmetrical or asymmetrical form, is at the heart of legitimate 
authority. Lindahl puzzles his readers with a beautifully circular way of char-
acterizing this relation, whereby the gaze of recognition is mirrored back to 
the person recognizing another. Hence, any misrecognition of the other re-
sults in misrecognizing what might have been oneself.24 In reply to such phe-
nomenological intricacy the second amendment emphasizes that in the case 
 
 20.  See THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE JARGON OF AUTHENTICITY (Knut Tarnowski & Frederic Will, 
trans., 1973) (1964). 
 21.  IACA stands for “institutionalized and authoritatively mediated collective action.” LINDAHL, 
supra note 1, at 54−60. 
 22.  Id. at 57−58, 103. 
 23.  Id. at 108, 158. 
 24.  Id. at 341. 
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of law recognizing people as “legal subjects” is already a way of addressing 
the internally tangled relation of recognition and misrecognition. 
IV. THE GEOLOGY OF THE “WE” 
It is the most fundamental premise of Lindahl’s work that legal orders 
are “a species of collective action.”25 Following Margaret Gilbert,26 he ex-
plains that in order to account for such action a distinction needs to be made 
between “we together” and “we as each.” While “we together” stands for 
participants in a joint action, the latter designates us as unconnected and un-
related individuals. Lindahl’s analysis of inclusion and exclusion relies—
exclusively, I add tongue in cheek—on the first version of “wehood” (apol-
ogies for polluting English with the German penchant for nouns), which is 
usually denoted with an asterisk added (“we*). 
 
We together (we*) We each 
 
The existence of such wehood is manifest, as Lindahl himself explains, 
in the mutual commitment to work towards the attainment of shared ends.27 
Not only do the participants in joint action intend to contribute with their 
own acts to some joint venture, they are also considered to be under an obli-
gation to step in and to secure the venture’s success if something seems to 
go wrong or if the plan of action needs to be amended on the go.28 While 
each participant is primarily responsible for contributing his or her bit to 
what might eventually add up to a collective act, all participants also bear a 
residual responsibility to do whatever is necessary to make the joint action 
possible or, at any rate, to abstain from conduct that would subvert it. It is 
worth keeping this in mind, for it is this idea that is irreconcilable with other 
claims that are made in this book. 
Intriguingly, in order to explain how legal systems of a global scope 
necessarily exclude when they include, Lindahl disaggregates, following 
Bert van Roermund’s lead,29 the domain of “we* together” into the “we* 
 
 25.  Id. at 47. 
 26.  See MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: MEMBERSHIP, 
COMMITMENT, AND THE BONDS OF SOCIETY 146 (2006). 
 27.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
 28.  See id. The example used by Lindahl is that of people preparing a meal together in the kitchen. 
If the person tasked with peeling the potatoes realizes that the soup is boiling over that person is obligated 
to take the soup off the burner even though her primary responsibility lies elsewhere. There is a residual 
responsibility on the part of all to do whatever they can do in order to make the project succeed. 
 29.  See Bert van Roermund, First Person Plural Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representa-
tion, 6 PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS 235 (2006). 
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speaker” and the “we* at stake” (eventually, he adds also the “we* au-
thor”).30 
  
We* together 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
We* speaker We* at stake We* author 
 
The point of these more fine grained distinctions is to provide an ac-
count of such systems as collectives, i.e., as subjects of a transpersonal scale 
that are created in processes of representing a putative unity attributed to 
them by those taking action on their behalf. While the “we* as agent” desig-
nates regulators or overseers,31 the “we* at stake” stands for the regulated, 
understood as those who in virtue of their compliance with the rules laid 
down by the regulators contribute to some common action. Only if the self-
understandings and, more importantly, the intentions of the first and the sec-
ond we* sufficiently overlap can it be said that the we* is self-determining. 
Quoting from Lindahl: 
Insofar as each of the . . . governance networks claims to act on behalf of 
a global collective qua unity of interest, hence not merely as the aggregate 
of the interests of a range of agents, each of those networks claims a certain 
autonomy for itself and for the global collective that it regulates . . . . 
Indeed, the first-person plural perspective of a global collective has cor-
relative faces: on the one hand, a claim by a governance network to regu-
latory autonomy vis-à-vis states; on the other, the presupposition of a 
global we*, with a distinct interest irreducible to that of state collectives, 
and which the network claims to represent. If, by and large, the addressees 
of regulation by a global governance network act in accordance with its 
rules, it is warranted to assert that a collective self—the hallmark of col-
lective unity—has emerged and, with it, autonomy as collective self-
rule.32 
Now, remarkably, Lindahl cautions us that we shouldn’t assume that 
voluntary compliance by the folks on the ground bestows democratic legiti-
macy on the collective self. There is no equivalence between collective self-
determination and democracy. If there were, the “we* at stake” would with-
out anything further coincide with the “we* author.” But this, according to 
Lindahl, is decidedly not the case.33 The “we* at stake” are those for the sake 
 
 30.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 98. 
 31.  See id. at 54, 57, 59, 88. The reference to regulators is too narrow, of course. Using Lindahl’s 
parlance, one had better refer to those who articulate, monitor and uphold the default setting of action. 
 32.  Id. at 104−05. 
 33.  Id. at 105–06. 
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of whose interests the rules are set, monitored and modified considered as a 
group. A we* of this type—and the requisite collective autonomy—exists, 
Lindahl claims, also when we are confronted with a theocracy or an autoc-
racy.34 This implies that in order to exist the “we* at stake” does not require 
any identification on the part of agents “on the ground”—the addressees—
with the legal order that the “we* as agent” sets up on their behalf. Rather, it 
is fair to conclude that the “we* at stake” is what it is, and exists, in virtue of 
what the “we* as agents” fancy it to be. The “we* at stake” is the imaginary 
focus of the activity of the regulators as a group. 
This idea—accurate as it may seem, indeed, with an eye to the rhetoric 
employed by those talking from the commanding heights of global regula-
tion of a “community” in whose interest they purportedly act—cannot be 
reconciled with the collective action model of the legal system. Indeed, it 
demonstrates that the whole social ontology developed in the work accounts 
for realities in a rather misleading way. 
For the purpose of constituting collective action not only the regulators 
must intend to act on behalf of a collective “we*,” but also the regulated 
when they comply with the rules that the former have laid down for them. 
The regulated need to comply with the intent to contribute to the success of 
what “we*” are doing. The regulated, passive we* is the “we* at stake”. If 
such a we* is merely fancied by the regulators, the link between the actions 
of the regulators and the actions of the regulated is broken. No collective 
action can emerge if the “we* at stake” is merely imagined by the regulators 
while the regulated behave in fact as “we each,” that is, as an aggregate of 
individuals whose acts are not tied to the pursuit of a common plan. 
V. A FIRST OBJECTION: LEGALITY NEGLECTED 
Puzzlingly, however, Lindahl claims that the link connecting the acts of 
the regulators and the regulated is intact. In Lindahl’s work, the “we* at 
stake” is always taken to be some global community. Global merchants are 
the “we* at stake” in the case of the lex mercatoria, the global banking com-
munity—or, owing to “nesting,”35 the global community of bank custom-
ers—is the “we* at stake” in the case of the Basel Committee. In virtue of 
the regulators fancying these “communities” the obedient folk become com-
plicit in global collective action. But this begs the question. Indeed, it in-
volves a petitio principii. It is implausible to suggest that we are even con-
fronted with collectives. A fortiori, the question of exclusion and inclusion 
does not arise in the first place. 
 
 34.  See id. at 105. 
 35.  See id. at 50. 
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In order to make sense of the detached manner in which many of the 
regulated act, Lindahl borrows a category from Scott Shapiro.36 This is the 
category of “massively shared agency.”37 According to this view, whoever 
contributes to collective action does not have to be necessarily concerned 
about its success. This raises the question, of course, whether there would 
still be collective action if none of the persons involved cared about the out-
come. Are we confronted, that is, with collective action where the sovereign 
commander sets the rules and threatens his subjects into impotence? Clearly 
not, and this may be the reason why Shapiro suggests that for there to be 
collective action at least “most” have to act in accordance with the plan vol-
untarily while only a few others may not.38 But if that were true, one im-
portant component of collective action would still be conspicuous by its ab-
sence. Lindahl considers it, correctly, essential for its existence, namely the 
shared commitment to its success. It is the component that explains why we 
reprimand participants for doing nothing and remaining inactive in the event 
that something goes wrong or a plan needs to be amended on the go. If people 
are free to remain indifferent to the project and to stay uninvolved it is plainly 
wrong to describe their conduct as participation in the realization of a plan. 
This is even worse in the case of what Lindahl calls, building upon Shapiro’s 
idea, “massively alienated agency.”39 Such can be found in cases where par-
ticipants not only do not share the goal, but rather do not even understand 
it.40 Lindahl thereby attributes collective agency to all kinds of dupes, in par-
ticular, the global flock that goes with the crowd or simply does as it has 
been told to do for whichever reason or maybe for none at all. Nobody can 
intend to contribute to a goal of which he or she is not even aware. As a 
description of collective action this must strike one as wrong-headed. 
What both Shapiro and Lindahl discover in this context is, quite inter-
estingly, the legality of law, that is, the detached attitude with which legal 
rules are complied. But it is exactly the legality of law that explains why the 
legal system is not, decidedly not, a system of collective action.41 Law leaves 
it to the addressees to comply in any manner, and with any attitude, they see 
fit. 
 
 36.  See Scott J. Shapiro, Massively Shared Agency, in RATIONAL AND SOCIAL AGENCY: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL BRATMAN 257, 257–92 (Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe eds., 2014). 
 37.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 57−58. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 142−50 (2011). 
 38.  See LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 104. 
 39.  Id. at 108. 
 40.  Id. at 157. 
 41.  It is ironic, to say the least, that the author of the book on Legality ignores what it means in the 
understanding in which we have inherited the idea from Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS (M. Gregor, trans., 1996). 
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VI. A SECOND OBJECTION: ORGANIZISM 
The consequence of Shapiro’s and Lindahl’s approach should not elude 
us. Their way of conceiving of collective action assumes that whoever enters 
into a contractual agreement, relying on the rules that the regulators have 
provided for such an occasion, thereby contributes to the realization of con-
tract law as a legal institution. This implies that their action means partici-
pating in the realization of legal institutions no matter to what it may have 
been that they have set their mind. Such an account of human action would 
be accurate only if it were right to view persons that avail themselves of the 
law of contracts for their private ends as the organs of the system of private 
law. This, at any rate, appears to have been the view of nineteenth century 
jurists of the romanticist historical school.42 Such a view presupposes, thus 
understood, an emphatically organicistic social ontology. 
Organicists believe that the unexamined and not reflected consequences 
of individual acts demonstrate that these acts are truly the acts of the social 
organism of which the individuals are part. Using an obvious example, the 
act of sexual intercourse, even though intended by individuals to satisfy their 
sexual urges, is an act directed at reproducing the species. That’s what this 
act essentially is from a biological perspective, for individuals are essentially 
specimens of a species. One is an “organ” regardless of whether one intends 
to be one. 
It emerges clearly, however, that the organicistic view of action does 
not view action as joint action. The individuals in question are who they are 
in virtue of being part of an organic whole. The relevant act is not commonly 
coordinated. 
The important conclusion to be drawn at this point is the following: the 
“we* at stake” exists only in the imagined form in which it is envisaged from 
the commanding heights of the administrators. It does not exist, that is, from 
the perspective of the folks on the ground. From their perspective this “we*” 
actually is an ideological distortion of social realities. They—the folks on the 
ground—exist for one another only as “we each.” With that we arrive at the 
accurate picture. The “putative unity” of the “we* at stake” exists only for 
the regulators. The regulated are “we each.” Lindahl’s theory is prone to fall 
prey to the ideological claims of the regulators for the reason of failing to 
scrutinize their pretensions. The theory does not examine the ontologically 
precarious status of the “we* at stake.”43 Indeed, it takes almost naively for 
granted that any claim of someone to act in the interest of all persons globally 
 
 42.  See ALEXANDER SOMEK, RECHTSSYSTEM UND REPUBLIK: ÜBER DIE POLITISCHE FUNKTION 
DES SYSTEMATISCHEN RECHTSDENKENS (1992). 
 43.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 117. 
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affected is tantamount to claiming that the bearer of this interest is a collec-
tively acting we*.44 This is the root of the organicistic fallacy. It is beautifully 
revealed in the following sentence: 
[…][W]ho enacts rules claims to reaffirm a collective’s identity, such that 
the addressees of those rules can recognize themselves as a group and they 
are/ought to be as a group.45 
But this is a non sequitur. Whoever enacts rules in the interest of all claims 
to enact rules in the interest of all and does not make any assertions concern-
ing the ontological status of the persons affected. 
VII. FORWARDS BACK TO VOEGELIN 
Viewing “massively shared” and “massively alienated” agency as in-
stances of collective action is terribly implausible. Nevertheless, classifying 
human agency in these terms reveals as much as it conceals. It conceals what 
is really going on. But it also reveals a bit of it. Membership is something 
that happens to individuals. It is imposed from above. They become enlisted. 
The global regulators have the power to imagine communities and, poten-
tially, the authority to bring them about. 
Lindahl’s work is, therefore, apt to reveal as well as to conceal. Far too 
quickly it moves past the juncture at which the author could have explained 
that the processes that we encounter in the era of globalization are authori-
tarian at heart. But once we pause, we can catch a glimpse of the matter. We 
merely have to take our cue from the “existential” concept of representation 
developed by Eric Voegelin in his, admittedly, somewhat esoteric New Sci-
ence of Politics.46 The parallels are particularly striking not least because 
Voegelin, like Lindahl, also uses the concept of “representation” in order to 
account for the “articulation” of collectives. 
In this slim volume, Voegelin takes up ideas that he had developed in 
his early work The Authoritarian State (written as an apology of the so-called 
Austro-Fascist government).47 According to Voegelin, who draws heavily on 
the work by Maurice Hauriou, the representative brings an institution into 
being in light of what he or she believes to be its leading idea.48 It is thereby 
that he or she moulds the hearts and minds of the people supposed to accept 
the order—to consent to it routinely. Existentially, Voegelin adds, the au-
thority of the representative precedes any effort to rein in his or her conduct 
 
 44.  Id. at 107, 117. 
 45.  Id. at 111. 
 46.  See ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION (1952). 
 47.  See ERIC VOEGELIN, DER AUTORITÄRE STAAT: EIN VERSUCH ÜBER DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE 
STAATSPROBLEM (1936). 
 48.  See VOEGELIN, supra note 46, at 48−49. 
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by constitutional means. This matches how Lindahl conceives of representa-
tion: 
[…] [T]he claim that we* are a unity and what it is that joins us together 
as a unity is always a representational claim. This might sound innocuous; 
it isn’t: collectives emerge by way of acts of representation that include 
and exclude without a prior authorization to do so by their addressees. 
Representational acts include by establishing the boundaries of (il)legal-
ity, and exclude by banishing all other possible configurations of legal or-
der to the domain of what is deemed inconsequential for collective action. 
 
[…] [A]uthority is the capacity to articulate a representation—a vision—
of who we* really are/ought to be that, in hindsight and for the time being, 
gains wide allegiance among its addresses and motivates them to act as a 
group that can deal with challenges to its contingent existence.49 
Voegelin’s work, particularly if read in juxtaposition with The Authoritarian 
State, is useful to determine more clearly the authoritarian element in repre-
sentation that is also key to Lindahl’s analysis of inclusion and exclusion. 
Lindahl speaks of the necessarily and irretrievably  “representative” way in 
which agents attribute a “putative,” and a fortiori tentative, unity to the col-
lective for which they establish a default framework of action in light of what 
they take to be its point.50 He also suggests contestability inheres in how 
representatives create closure. What Voegelin allows us to perceive, how-
ever, is that what the agents fancy to be the “we* at stake” sets the terms for 
interactions with folks on the ground and anticipates at least the contours of 
the institution—the default setting of action—that is to be created in their 
wake.51 Voegelin allows us to perceive most clearly that the mere anticipa-
tion of a “we* at stake” is an authoritarian pretension.52 This pretension can 
be encountered variously in the regulatory processes happening on the global 
level, such as the Basel Committee or the decentralized systems of interna-
tional arbitration. 
 
 49.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 232−33, 329 (emphasis in original). 
 50.  Id. at 109−12. 
 51.  See id. at 343 (“If collectives emerge through representational acts, so also representational acts 
mark the emergence of authority in the sense indicated earlier: the capacity to articulate a representation—
a vision—of who we* really are/ought to be that, in hindsight and for the time being, gains wide allegiance 
among its addressees and motivates them to act as a group that can deal with challenges to its contingent 
existence.”). 
 52.  Compare this with LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 233: “Representational acts include by establish-
ing the boundaries of (il)legality, and exclude by banishing all other possible configurations of legal order 
to the domain of what is deemed inconsequential for collective action. Notice, moreover, that it is not just 
practical possibilities excluded from the domain of law that lack prior authorisation; the practical possi-
bilities concerning who ought to do what, where and when included by representational acts also lack ex 
ante authorisation. [. . .] Both sides of the closure wrought by representational acts (representation as), as 
well as the attribution of the act to a collective (representation of), the prior existence of which the act of 
re-presentation takes for granted, are always contestable and premature.” 
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VIII. A SYSTEMIC CONTEXT OF ACTION 
Even though Lindahl is aware of the authoritarian element inherent in 
establishing boundaries, his account still remains to be somewhat idyllic. It 
is idyllic because by embracing the Heideggerian account of “space” and 
“world” he locates the law principally in the life-world as the “transcendental 
place” at which we are jointly planning our actions and using reasons in order 
to explain or to justify our doings.53 The law is viewed as embedded in a 
context in which it can be debated with an eye to—and this is of particular 
importance to Lindahl—the point of what is supposed to be common action 
or the self-image of a community. The world of law making is, putting it in 
Habermasian terms, the world of communicative action. Such action is man-
ifest in the coordination of conduct by means of communicative exchanges 
concerning its purpose and means. 
Famously, in 1981—in his Theory of Communicative Action—Haber-
mas distinguished, however, between law as an institution and law as a me-
dium of communication54 (the distinction that created quite a stir back then). 
While the former is manifest in sets of norms that emerge against the back-
ground of moral norms inherent in our life worlds and, hence, are subject to 
debate and readjustment in the course of communicative action, law as a me-
dium functions by means of linking normative claims with money and 
power. Once the law is coupled with these media of communication it can 
rely on signals (notably, prices and sanctions) to impart the desired results. 
Those signals—costs and adverse consequences—are relevant in contexts of 
strategic interaction in which participants attempt to influence each other’s 
behavior by means of incentives or threats, and not with arguments concern-
ing the moral merits of legal norms. Law as a medium of communication is 
what we encounter if law comes attached with the strings of coercion or if it 
owes its efficacy to the expected economic gains that accrue from compli-
ance. In this format, the law is not viewed as lending expression to a legiti-
mate institutional ordering but seen through the lens of power and money as 
media of communication. Legal norms merely signal how one ought to be-
have because of constraints that are beyond one’s control. 
It is totally irrelevant for the addresses of law as a medium whether they 
are considered to be part of a “we* at stake.” They have no interest in repre-
sentation and whatnot. What they attempt to do is to adapt shrewdly to cir-
cumstances that they would be able to control if they offered incentives or 
issued threats themselves. In Gilbert’s words, they act as “we each”. National 
 
 53.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DER PHILOSOPHISCHE DISKURS DER MODERNE 408–09 (Suhrkamp, 
1985). 
 54.  See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS, VOL. 2: ZUR KRITIK DER 
FUNKTIONALISTISCHEN VERNUNFT 536 (1981). 
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regulators in smaller countries adopt the banking standards established by 
the Basel Committee, for that is necessary to secure the success of their na-
tional banking system. They have economic incentives to do so. National 
legislatures take the recommendations of the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion to heart, for this is what promises to keep them and their local producers 
out of trouble before the Dispute Settlement Body when it comes to the ap-
plication of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. This is 
what happens from a sociological point of view. Nothing could be more re-
moved from our experience than a “community” of traders in foodstuffs. It 
is far more plausible to view law from the perspective of contexts that are 
marked by asymmetries of powers and to see it debated, if at all, under con-
ditions of “distorted communication.” The phenomenological approach does 
not seem to fit well enough the realities of banking regulation or international 
investment arbitration. Clearly, the world of commercial dispute settlement 
may have its own way of romanticizing itself. But this does not alter the fact 
that we are confronted with a systemic context of strategic interaction. 
IX. AUTHORITY, AUTHORIAL AND DEFERENTIAL 
If there is no collective agency, then the situation is such that there is 
just regulating, monitoring and upholding, on the one hand, and regulation-
taking for a variety of reasons, on the other. One of these reasons may give 
rise to what I call “pure cosmopolitan self-determination”.55 It is a patholog-
ical form of autonomy, for it transforms passivity into an irrational resolution 
of the conflict between autonomy and dependence on the knowledge of oth-
ers. But this need not detain us here.56 
Yet, Lindahl’s rich ontology of agency presents us with a way of over-
coming the disconnect between what regulators imagine to be a collective 
(“we* at stake”) and the folks on the ground (“we each”). The community 
projected by the regulators could be connected with the regulated by giving 
a say to the folks on the ground. In such a case a “we* author” would emerge: 
Democratic collectivity […] requires that, by and large, the members of 
this group can view themselves as jointly authoring (the default setting of) 
what their group action is/ought to be about. This requires, in turn, that 
such members can view a global governance network as authorized by 
them to act in their interest by articulating, monitoring and upholding the 
point of their joint action.57 
 
 55.  See ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 32, 247 (2014). 
 56.  See Alexander Somek, Accidental Cosmopolitanism, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 371 
(2012). 
 57.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 107. 
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Evidently, Lindahl’s not merely functional,58 but normative concept of au-
thority is all about common authorship. This explains why, in addition to the 
“we* speaker” and the “we* at stake,” which is the we* envisaged by the 
regulators, he adds the “we* author.”59 The latter is necessary to account for 
authority in the sense of common authorship.60 Authority, normatively un-
derstood, is, indeed, about those having some sort of input or impact on de-
cisions who consider themselves to be part of a “we* at stake.” But since 
processes of authorization are mediated by representation (the unity of the 
collective is always a represented unity)61 it is, again, highly implausible to 
assume that something like genuine collective self-determination, let alone 
collective action, could result from it. An ineradicably authoritarian element 
is bound to remain. 
But perhaps it would have been more advisable to work with a concept 
of authority that is less poetic and more focused on the elementary fact of 
“yielding to someone” or, for that matter, “surrendering one’s judgment.”62 
Such a concept dissociates “doing as another tells one to do” from the idea 
of one’s own authorship. Lindahl’s social imaginary suggests that “demo-
craticizations” or authorizations work in a manner in which the “we* at 
stake” is first imagined by the regulators and then challenged and trans-
formed from below, that is, by those capable of providing authorization. Yet, 
the regulation of international trade is hardly ever about the “global trade 
community”; it is about tunas and dolphins and hormone beef. It is not the 
case that authority can be legitimate only if it is articulated from within the 
correctly shaped community and sufficiently animated by the voices speak-
ing from below. Ever since John Locke perceived the origin of authority to 
lie, vis-à-vis right holders, in the supreme ability of adjudicative institutions 
to make sure that in the resolution of disputes the law is observed,63 authority 
has been about surrendering one’s own judgement to those who can credibly 
claim to know and to judge better than oneself. 
Actually, the construction of the conditions of autonomous agency does 
not have to adopt at all the poetic image of authorship. We do x because y 
has said so. This is the basic relation of authority. We follow authoritative 
directives and still regard ourselves as autonomous in the sense of being sus-
ceptible to reasons—right reasons, that is—as long as yielding the x issued 
 
 58.  According to the functional concept of authority, authorities are what authorities do, namely, 
agents articulating, monitoring and upholding the default structure of common action. Id. at 59−60. 
 59.  Id. at 106. 
 60.  Id. at 107. 
 61.  Id. at 109, 133, 181. 
 62.  Yes, the reference is of course to JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 63.  See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). 
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by y is a reasonable thing to do. There may well be good political grounds 
for yielding to the judgment of others in the face of disagreement. This is a 
road that Lindahl has not taken owing to his preoccupation with matters of 
collective identity. 
This observation concludes my first amendment. It proposes to shift the 
emphasis of the project from the construction of collective identities and 
agency towards an analysis of the authoritarian core of global regulation.  In 
addition it suggests that authority is, where it exists, not a matter of author-
ship but a question of exploring whether one has good reasons to do as an-
other tells one to do. 
X. INTEGRITY INSTEAD OF IDENTITY 
The organicistic fallacy, identified above, is merely the symptom of an-
other difficulty. Obviously, Lindahl puts much emphasis on collective unity 
or identity. Owing to the significance he attributes to it, the identity must 
appear to be constantly at risk. He thereby gives us, I am afraid, a misleading 
image of our political world. Why this is the case can perhaps best be ex-
plained with an eye to how we cope with the demands of our personal iden-
tity. 
Is it really the case that my identity as a person is at stake when I commit 
a single act that is not consistent with my practical identity, that is, with the 
type of person I take myself to be, at any rate, for certain purposes?64 As-
sume, for the sake of the argument, that owing to some strange affliction I 
listen to Elvis Presley rather than to string quartet music from the Viennese 
classic. Listening to Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven would, from the per-
spective of Lindahl’s theoretical grid, fit my “default setting” of action and 
allow me to pass as traditional, perhaps somewhat stuffy, Viennese urbanite. 
The appeal that Love me Tender has to me would, in Lindahl’s universe, be 
the equivalent of an a-legal challenge to a legal system’s identity. Allowing 
the challenge to go forward I lend the limits of my practical identity suscep-
tible to redefinition: 
[…][A]-legal behaviour has the form of a demand for what is due or de-
served, which calls into question – disputes – the justness and validity of 
the limits of the legal order, thereby unleashing a struggle about the bound-
aries of (il)legality in which the collective identity and the identity of who 
raises the demand are put to the proof.65 
 
 64.  On the concept of “practical identity,” see CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF 
NORMATIVITY 101 (1996), where a practical identity is characterized as “description under which you 
value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be 
worth undertaking.” 
 65.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 311. 
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 From this perspective, listening to what has hitherto appeared to me to 
be non-music requires a realignment of my musical taste that forces me to 
refine the terms and limits of my identity as a musical connoisseur. 
But there is an alternative and possibly more plausible description of 
what listening to Elvis entails. While I am listening to his song I am pushing 
into the background my admiration for the largo cantabile e mesto of 
Haydn’s g-minor string quartet called “The Rider”. I hold my admiration in 
abeyance until the next proper occasion arises to express it. My listening to 
Elvis neither affects nor engages my identity as a musical connoisseur since 
I am thereby simply taking a leave of absence from the strictures of my self-
image. I am still a sophisticated city dweller even if I am on one or the other 
occasion listening to bits and pieces of cheesy pop music. As is well known, 
legal systems operate in a very similar manner. Courts tacitly depart from 
established precedents by permitting all kinds of modifications to go forward 
until, of course, they slowly realize that a field of law has fallen into disar-
ray.66 This is the challenge to identity that is of relevance, namely, the threat 
of operating arbitrarily. The question of inclusion and exclusion is second-
ary. It arises in the context of a quest for coherence or, putting it in 
Dworkinian terms, in the course of aiming at integrity.67 It is not, at any rate, 
a given. 
XI. UBIQUITOUS REINVENTION EFFACES IDENTITY 
And yet, my identity is contingent. It is just as contingent as legal orders 
are.68 While, according to Lindahl, legal orders remain questionable and re-
sponsive with regard to the practical possibilities that they exclude, their lim-
its can be corrected. Nevertheless, their very limitedness cannot be over-
come. It is with regard to such limitedness that Lindahl claims that limits 
have to be regarded also as “fault lines.”69 The boundaries of a legal order 
have to be viewed as fault lines inasmuch as any expansion or contraction of 
limits invariably relies on a blind spot that circumscribes a collective’s prac-
tical possibilities.70 This non plus ultra of transformative action cannot be 
overcome by legal systems. 
It stands to reason whether this claim, were it to amount to an insight, 
could ever be of any relevance to a legal system. For two reasons, I am afraid 
that it might not be. The first is that it makes reinvention into a quotidian 
 
 66.  See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1991). 
 67.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–75 (1986). 
 68.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 282. 
 69.  Id. at 282, 299. 
 70.  Id. at 299−300, n.18. See generally GÜNTER SCHULTE, DER BLINDE FLECK IN LUHMANNS 
SYSTEMTHEORIE (1993). 
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affair. The second is that it tacitly rests on a romantic view of selfhood that 
renders individual and collective selves as devoid of content. With that I ar-
rive at my second amendment that proposes to drop the “beautiful soul”. 
According to the thoroughly contingent nature of legal orders71 any le-
gal system invariably may touch base with what it excludes in every single 
operation. Hence, from the perspective of a-legality72 any adjustment that is 
made in light of the “questionability” and “responsiveness” of joint action 
gives rise to ruptures from which new legal systems emerge. The constituent 
power – potentia – of a-legality is present73 in every single act. Arguably, 
this is just like imagining that one becomes a new person in every single 
moment in which one is breaking out of established routines. I am listening 
to Elvis. I am thereby taking on a new practical identity. This is implausible. 
But even if the idea were sound, I could treat it with great indifference. If 
reinventing myself becomes a quotidian affair it loses any significance for 
my life. This demonstrates that an overemphasis on identity transforms iden-
tity into a triviality. 
Overemphasizing identity comes at an additional cost. Lindahl’s analy-
sis repeatedly suggests that, for example, there is an incommensurability in 
the relation between the clashing worldviews of the WTO and of Indian 
farmers. But perhaps the world-views are perfectly translatable—they are all 
about production and gain—and it is merely the interests that clash. There is 
a strange tendency in this book—and it is the tendency of our time—to con-
flate conflicts of interest with conflicts of Weltanschauungen. 
XII. UNIVERSAL MISRECOGNITION IMPLIES AN EMPTY SELF 
A similar problem arises with regard to the unresolved internal contra-
diction of recognition. Purportedly, any recognition is also misrecognition: 
To recognise the ‘other as one of us’ is always, to a lesser or greater extent, 
to assimilate the other. Recognition is also always misrecognition. And 
because recognition of the other is a self-recognition, recognition is always 
also misrecognition of the other and the self.74 
Wow. If we say to someone else “you are one of us” then we can be sure 
there is something that we have ignored about this other. We recognize 
someone as one of us. The recognition of the other thereby also sets the terms 
 
 71.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 282. 
 72.  A-legality is the perspective on the legal order that challenges how legal orders draw the dis-
tinction between what is legal and illegal. Existing legal systems experience a-legality as “strange”. Its 
impact gives rise to new ways of drawing the distinction and hence to alternative forms of inclusion and 
exclusion. See LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 196–98, 228, 296, 311. See also HANS LINDAHL, FAULT LINES 
OF GLOBALIZATION: LEGAL ORDER AND THE POLITICS OF A-LEGALITY 37–38, 156–57, 159–61 (2013). 
 73.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 196, 199, 299. 
 74.  Id. at 283. 
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for who we are. In not recognizing what the other is, beyond and aside of our 
terms of recognition, we also misrecognize unrealized possibilities of who 
we might be or might become.75 Boundaries, therefore, also exclude what 
they include.76 Thus understood, the other is, just as we are ourselves, even 
if recognized, an infinite resource of unrecognized difference—a reserve 
army of difference, as it were.77 By recognizing the other we force him to 
appear to us on our own terms. Each act of healing inflicts new wounds. 
In reversing this process, a-legality supposedly reveals the radical con-
tingency of collective identity: 
A-legality is political, in this strong sense, by dint of bringing the contin-
gency of collectives out into the open in a twofold sense: that we* are a 
collective and what we* are as a collective.78 
Relatively solid compounds of unity are cracked open through acts of a-le-
gality. 
Underlying this idea are two asymmetries, which are introduced by Lin-
dahl in reverse order. 
Asymmetry 2 is the preference that every collective action necessarily 
has for the inside,79 a matter that is confirmed, as Lindahl correctly observes, 
indirectly by how the “all affected” and the “all subjected” principle selec-
tively focus on important excluded interests only.80 The interests of outsiders 
have to be significant enough to pass a threshold of relevance. This attests to 
the priority of the inside, which is unavoidable for without it there would be 
no collective action at all. The priority is, however, also manifest in the fact 
that claims to recognition have to be cast in the language of the collective. 
The existing collective sets the terms of recognition. Asymmetry 2, therefore, 
tilts recognition towards the inside. 
Asymmetry 1, by contrast, reverses this asymmetry and tilts it towards 
the outside, for it points to the fact that demands for recognition reveal limits 
as “fault-lines”. Any existing collective experiences demands for recognition 
as irritating, as something that appears to come out of nothing: 
Demands for recognition are prior to joint action because they catch the 
collective by surprise, evincing practical possibilities for acting together 
that it had not and could not have anticipated, hence as a future which 
comes in advance of the future for which we* were prepared and had al-
ready rendered present through our joint action.81 
 
 75.  Id. at 341. 
 76.  Id. at 230, 284, 306. 
 77.  Id. at 327. 
 78.  Id. at 308. 
 79.  Id. at 280. 
 80.  Id. at 273−77. 
 81.  Id. at 281. 
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Asymmetry 1 looks at legal systems from the perspective of the reserve 
army of practical possibilities that is bound to remain forever excluded. No 
matter which attempt is undertaken to recognize the unrecognized, some-
thing will remain out there falling victim to misrecognition, not least of all 
the selfhood of all insiders. Asymmetry 1, hence, introduces a perspective of 
universal victimhood, whereas Asymmetry 2 is the perspective of authoritar-
ian orderings trampling upon the sentiments and aspirations of those whom 
it excludes through acts of inclusion. 
The perspective of universal victimhood—which is nothing short of the 
default position of our social existence—suggests, of course, that there is 
something out there that is in infinitely rich and, indeed, so rich and nuanced 
that it must necessarily elude any attempt at recognition and inclusion. It is 
so infinitely rich that no collective ordering is ever able to embrace it. No-
body can state what accounts for this richness for any attempt to state that 
rich something would already amount to an act of misrecognition. 
It follows that owing to its elusiveness that which is infinitely rich is 
supposedly also indefinitely indeterminate. Yes, that’s right, Hegel’s Science 
of Logic has introduced us to this idea. Pure being in all its fullness is tanta-
mount to nothingness.82 If there is no way of avoiding misrecognition then 
there is indeed nothing to recognize. The omnipresent reserve army of vic-
tims comprises a set of empty selves.83 They are specimens of what Hegel 
derided, with an eye to Rousseau possibly, as “beautiful souls”. Pinkard re-
constructs this way of conceiving of the self as follows: 
Deprived of all social content, it has nothing to it. In his search for the 
truly authentic as being the absolutely personal, the “beautiful soul” finds 
that there is no “core” to himself; he finds that searching for the self in the 
purely subjective parts of one’s life is like peeling away the rings of the 
onion only to find that when all the rings have been peeled away, there is 
nothing there, that there is in fact no “core” to the self that supposedly lies 
at the end of such an activity of “paring down” to the “core.”84 
XIII. VAIN AND EMPTY SUBJECTIVITY MISREPRESENTS 
FREEDOM OF CHOICE 
The belief that recognition cannot fully capture the alterity of the other 
is the idol on the philosophical altar of the phenomenological movement, 
 
 82.  See G.W.F. HEGEL, WERKE IN ZWANZIG BÄNDEN, VOL. 8, 183 (E. Moldenhauer & K.M. 
Michel eds., Suhrkamp 1969-1971) [Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences]. 
 83.  In a similar vein on “subjectless selves,” see JULIANE REBENTISCH, DIE KUNST DER FREIHEIT: 
ZUR DIALEKTIK DEMOKRATISCHER EXISTENZ 278 (2012). 
 84.  TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY: THE SOCIALITY OF REASON 214 (1994). 
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another movement to which Lindahl seems to profess his allegiance.85 Hegel, 
as the reader may have guessed, debunked this idea as the pretension of 
“vain” and “empty” subjectivity.86 
But this conflict of philosophical perspectives does not even have to be 
settled here. For it is the case that within a legal context we are cast not as 
individuals—not, that is, in our particularity, which is, at any rate, at the cen-
ter of love—but as personae exercising freedom of choice in the pursuit of 
various ends. We enter a legal relation with one another as soon as our per-
sonhood is recognized in the abstract.87 
Conceiving of us as mere choosers provides the ultimate template of 
accounting for the selectivity of various “legal worlds”. Inclusion and exclu-
sion are rendered as choices that are contingent and amenable to revision. In 
other words, the battles over the substance of our social arrangements (our 
social “worlds” and “legal systems”) are part of our social experience only 
because we have always and already mutually constituted ourselves as 
choosers. This is what we take ourselves to be within the legal relation. 
More importantly, it is not some misrecognised individual or collective 
selfhood, but freedom of choice that accounts for the contingency and con-
testability of legal regimes. The political struggles over the substance of law 
can be cast as collisions between and among legal systems only by falsely 
placing some indefinitely rich selfhood behind our mutually recognized ca-
pacity to choose. Yet, already Nietzsche cautioned us against making more 
of the subject than a fantasy that is supplemented by thought: Das Subjekt ist 
etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes.88 The indefinite reserve army of purportedly mis-
recognised selves is but a guise—a spectre, perhaps—of the freedom at-
tributed to legal personae. 
Admittedly, what we attribute as a choice to legal personae is not a 
natural fact. It is a social construct (“yeah!”). The construct emerges from 
the legal relation.89 Paying attention to the significance of this relation, then, 
is what I propose as my second amendment. 
 
 85.  LINDAHL, supra note 1, at 36, 93–96, 110. For introductions, see DAN ZAHAVI, SELF AND 
OTHER: EXPLORING SUBJECTIVITY, EMPATHY, AND SHAME (2014); BARBARA MERKER, 
SELBSTTÄUSCHUNG UND SELBSTERKENNTNIS: ZUR HEIDEGGERS TRANSFORMATION DER 
PHÄNOMENOLOGIE HUSSERLS (1988). 
 86.  See HEGEL, supra note 82, VOL. 13, at 96 [Lectures on Aesthetics, vol. 1]. 
 87.  See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, ON HUMAN CONDUCT 122, 203 (1972); MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, 
The Rule of Law, in ON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 129−79 (1999). 
 88.  “Es ist alles subjektiv’ sagt ihr: aber das ist schon Auslegung. Das ‚Subjekt’ ist nichts 
Gegebenes, sondern etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes. – Ist es zuletzt nötig, den Interpreten 
noch hinter die Interpretation zu setzen? Schon das ist Dichtung, Hypothese.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 
‚AUS DEM NACHLASS DER ACHTZIGERJAHRE,’ WERKE IN DREI BÄNDEN, VOL. 3, 903 (1956). 
 89.  See ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE LEGAL RELATION: LEGAL THEORY AFTER LEGAL POSITIVISM 
(2017). 
